

The Primacy of Faith-Feeling Over Science, Reason, and Logic

The Surprising Evidence Lurking in Jacobian Theology

Jeff Grupp

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1. Introduction: Jacobi on Faith

In this paper I discuss one strand of the philosophical theology of Counter Enlightenment writer Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1749–1832, German). I will discuss (1) his philosophy of Christian faith, as immediate experience of God, and (2) how Jacobi asserted that Christian faith is *feeling*, where Jacobi found that feeling is a more powerful analytic tool than science, logic, or reason. Obviously (2) will appear rather shocking to many, amid today's academic climate that emphasizes reason, logic, and science, which are believed (pun intended) to be either superior to, or devoid of, feeling and belief when utilized properly. And obviously (2) would lead to the conclusion that Christian faith, which is based largely in *feeling* (joy, hope, belief, love, etc.), would therein be superior in analytical capacity to science, logic, and reason. It may seem to many reading this article that, at this point in the article, (2) can only be hopelessly inane. However, we will find in Section 3 below that there are surprisingly obvious and thoroughly ironclad reasons for this finding (a finding flirted-with in the Cartesian *Meditations*, and which is often flirted with by contemporary epistemologists).

Consider an example of how, in the contemporary academic climate, reason, science, logic (the modes of human *thinking*) are taken, without evidence or argument, to be assumed to be separable from, and superior to, feeling and faith. Damasio displays this very early in the introduction to his famous book, which is actually a book that attempts

to be as sympathetic as possible to feeling and emotivity, though still putting it as a “lowly” inferior:

I began writing this book to propose that reason may not be as pure as most of us think it is or wish it were... This is not to deny that emotions and feelings can cause havoc in the processes of reasoning under certain circumstances. Traditional wisdom has told us that they can, and recent investigations of the normal reasoning process also reveal the potential harmful influence of emotional biases... Nor is this to say that when feelings have a positive action they do the deciding for us; or that we are not rational beings. I suggest only that certain aspects of the process of emotion and feeling are indispensable for rationality. At their best, feelings point us in the proper direction, take us to the appropriate place in a decision-making space, where we may put the instruments of logic to good use... Emotion and feeling, along with the covert physiological machinery underlying them, assist us with the daunting task of predicting an uncertain future and planning our actions accordingly... Emotion, feeling, and biological regulation all play a role in human reason. The lowly orders of our organism are in the loop of high reason. (Damasio 2000, xii-xiii)

The issue of emotional biases, in the context of this paper, is covered in part 3 below.

Jacobi has been recipient to tremendous criticism, some well-placed, some based on misunderstanding, and much that is slanderous and spiteful rather than erudite. But the evidence for (1) and especially (2) that we will uncover in Jacobi’s work in section 3 below contain significant and still mostly unknown contributions to the academic world, some of which is perhaps still starkly ahead of its time, and which could perhaps be revolutionary. Jacobi held a conception of Christian faith as being a meta-scientific concept that is not analyzable in terms of science, logic, and reason, but which in fact is the (secret) aspect of consciousness that is, in fact, generating the analytical work that leads to the creation of and the accomplishing of science and reason. Biblically, faith is arguably not intended to be something contained within, or discoverable by, the bounds of science (“we walk by faith not by sight”, “faith is the evidence of things unseen”), nor of reason (“the substance of things hoped for”, “and this is the victory that has overcome the world—our faith”), and

therefore, it is not surprising to find a theologian (Jacobi) claiming that faith is, in fact, a different sort of supernatural power (“your faith has healed you”, “a faith that can move mountains”), independent of scientific and logical reasoning.

Jacobi’s conception of faith as being experience of God contains the concept that faith is identical to *reason*. In other words, rather than human thinking and intellection giving rise to reason, instead it is the gift of faith (Heb. 12:2) and the feeling of faith, that contain reason and therefore lead to intellection and rational discovery. As has been noted by many since the time of Jacobi’s writings, his concept of faith as being the source of “reason” is, according to many, hopelessly vague (see Giovanni and Livieri 2018, 30-31). It may be true that Jacobi may not have always exercised the best choice of verbiage to convey why faith is reason, but his analysis leading to this claim can be teased out of his writings, and his findings were starkly convincing. And as indicated above, this claim will come across to many reading at this point in this article as being laughable, abhorrent, and false, but as the reader of this paper will see in subsection 3.2 below, there are starkly convincing indications for why Jacobi comes to this position.

In what follows we will find that hidden in the morass of Jacobi’s theological work lies analysis on why Jacobi would define “faith” in terms of feeling, and what reasons he has for adopting this seemingly ludicrous position. And it is via that discussion that we will see arise the finding that the only way the existence of physical reality or any objects in it can be known is firstly and primarily by feeling and belief, and not by empiricism and reason. This claim, if supported, and spelled-out below, would greatly damage what can broadly be considered as the Enlightenment-based idea that science, logic, and reason are superior to belief, feeling, and faith—a conception ubiquitously assumed since the Enlightenment up to the present-day by academics who are unaware of Jacobi’s findings, and who are not versed in the basics of the rudiments of epistemology.

2. Faith

2.1 The Ineffable

Jacobi was interested in how our reality contains a domain of what can be explained, and a domain of what cannot (of what is ineffable). Though seemingly obvious to me, this

statement may be controversial to many in the contemporary world, where it is often believed that all things have or should have a clear and obvious explanation. But a few examples of known entities that are ineffable would arguably be: a feeling, a mind, the experience of smell, existence, life, and color. And notice that each of those ineffables are items and aspects of reality at the rudimentary-bedrock level of reality, as if the ineffables consist of and/or are located at the primary and fundamental level of experience and reality. And notice that of the list just given, those ineffables are also *observables*, in the sense that they are items occupying a place of immediacy in experience, rather than an indirect or non-immediate place in consciousness. They are directly available as the building blocks of experience, rather than, for example, something more distant in consciousness, like an abstract *concept*, such as a mathematical object or a scientific concept such as graviton or a tectonic plate. And thus they are clearly known and even *well known* items and aspects of reality, despite being *ineffables* at the rudimentary level of experience. And adding to this, Jacobi, we will soon explore, for those reasons, will claim that the more primary ineffables are more knowable than the items of experience and reality that are not deemed to be ineffable.

So, as Jacobi noted, the ineffable level of reality (what Jacobi calls the *first order* of reality) contains that which is more primary in reality, but also which is better known and understood in reality, as compared to the level of reality that is supposedly *not* ineffable (what Jacobi calls the second order of reality). The second order, in Jacobian terminology, is believed to have explanation (labels, definition, naming), but is less fundamental (not at the bedrock-rudimentary level of reality and experience). For example, “apple” is the name of an object that is not ineffable, but the constituents of experience that compose the apple (taste, redness, three-dimensionality, solidity) are each ineffable: “apple” is the label that is believed to designate the apple as not being ineffable, but it is a label denoting a set of aspects comprising the apple that are each ineffable. In simpler terms: the more basic layers of experience are less prone to linguistic description but more prone to true inner understanding. Stewart (2018, 762-63), in his discussion of Jacobi, discusses how philosophers want explanation for seemingly everything imaginable, but explanation is not the most successful tool, since, for example, and as is well-known in science, things like energy, life, time, space, matter, and so forth, to just name a few, do not have agree-

upon definitions, and some, or perhaps even all of those, not only do not have (known) definitions at all, but furthermore are describable in terms of multiple straightforward linguistic contradictions, known all the way back to Zeno of Elea. For even a simple empirical item, such as an *apple*, is nearly impossibly difficult to describe let alone understand with language. If I say an apple is “a three-dimensional, solid, red, tasty fruit,” the term “red” defines an ineffable term that denotes inner/phenomenological content, as does the term “tasty.” “Three-dimensional” and “solid” will both reduce to material-topological extension, which fall into insurmountable definition problems,¹ as well documented in philosophical literature for centuries. And both fall into the domain of Zeno’s Measure Paradox, and the more modern flavors of the Measure Paradox that come in the form of the quantum mechanical discoveries and their consequent problems of how to explain solid continuous matter (*res extensa*) in terms of the mysteriousness of quantum energy. “Jacobi claimed there is a sphere of immediate knowing that remains untouched by science; it is here that we find religious faith” (Stewart 2018, 761). Stewart tells us that

[t]he goal should be not to ‘want to explain what is incomprehensible, but only [to want] to know the boundary where it begins and just recognize that it is there;’... Once the demarcation is established, one should desist from trying to explain what lies beyond what can be known” (762; Jacobi quotes from Jacobi 1785)

While it is valuable to further analyze those entities that are outside of knowability (the second-order entities, which can be labeled and named but *not* known and understood thereby), they should be accepted as, indeed, understood as being *outside* of knowability. Much of science and intellectual pursuits involve trying to explain the unexplainable, rather than letting it “remain a mystery” (763).

For these reasons, things like science and reason are, for Jacobi, second-order types of knowledge, where faith-information comprises the first-order. Humans are preoccupied with the second-order type of concepts, they ubiquitously try to put first-order information into the class of second-order (they believe what is, in fact, ineffable is not ineffable and can be given by explanation), and these cloud the direction of knowledge, which comes

¹ For example, see Grupp 2007, 2005.

from the first-order ineffables, and which contain immediate certainty. Jacobi claims that the second-order explanations are actually, largely often merely philosophical explanations (cf. Steward 2018, 763). That which is believed to be known by language is in fact better known by ineffable experience and cannot be put into clear description. The first-order items are only known as items of experiential existing, and are not capable of being put into any sort of description that can capture what the items are. Most of reality is of this type, and Jacobi would claim that the human, using language to try to describe reality, to understand reality, is using precisely the opposite internal faculty, the opposite tool, needed to understand reality, where instead feeling-faith is what is needed.

2.2 Proof of God Via Faith Experience

The points made in 2.1 about first- and second-order concepts also hold to God and the supernatural. Humans in contemporary civilization have obtained a passion to know that God is real via apologetical *reasoning*—that is, via the second-order. Jacobi rejected that human reason and science could arrive at a proof for the existence of God. He asserted that something else, other than language or science, is required to give rise to certainty about the infinite creator-God. According to Jacobi, understanding of God transcends human language, so no proofs for God will be successful, and furthermore, this leads to the assertion that God and faith in God are outside reason and science. Putting this matter in different words, Jacobi finds that a finite mind (such as a human mind) cannot find proof of an infinite (such as an infinite God). Worthington writes:

Certainly, says Jacobi, the highest ideas of Reason [where Reason is *faith*, for Jacobi]—those that partake of the divine—are not to be attained by demonstration, which would be no more than making finite that which is infinite; but this impossibility of proof and certain comprehension is the very nature of the divine. In feeling, then, in direct intuitive cognition, Jacobi found that certainty which Kant had demonstrated not to be in theoretic Reason. What lies beyond our discursive understanding, those judgments which transcend Reason, whose truth or probability we cannot discover by sensation and reflection, are the objects of faith. (Worthington 1878, 394)

Despite not being linguistically describable, it is important to note how Jacobi finds that the first-order items of both observable reality, and the reality of God, are both *knowable* by first-order faith.).

Although seemingly self-apparent, I nevertheless want to point out how this conception of faith is not referring to banal “churchy” *faith* (blind faith), so to speak, where believers (believe that they) make a choice at some point to take-on having a sort of blind-faith in God, and where that’s the pinnacle of Christianity. We can know that Jacobi is talking about faith experience as higher consciousness, and not the aforementioned banal churchy idea of faith, from quotes like the following:

The religion of the Christians instructs man how to take on qualities through which he can make progress in his existence and propel himself to a higher life – and with this life to a higher consciousness, in this consciousness to a higher cognition... Man becomes aware of God through a godly life, and there is a peace of God which is higher than all reason; in this peace there is the enjoyment and the intuition of an inconceivable love. (Quoted in Crowe 2009, 316)

That which is *experienced* is that which can be known. Any and all of *known* reality is *experienced* reality, that is all that any human has known: the flow of experience and the mysterious objects that populate experience. One knows little of reality via linguistic knowing, as the apple example above shows. For these reasons, reality is known by the modes of experiencing (feeling, mental imagery), which are first-order ineffable, and not primarily by the thought-mode experience, which is linguistic.

3. Feeling as Reality Verification

Next we will further explore why Jacobi placed such emphasis on the meta-linguistic inner principle of feeling. In subsection 3.2 we will explore the evidence for why feeling can be considered a superior tool for analytical investigation of reality, in Jacobian theology.

3.1 Feeling-Knowing vs. Linguistic-Knowing

Jacobi appeared to merely be advocating a flip of understanding: realizing that we know what we in fact know via ineffable mental energies (belief and feeling), and not by the commonly trusted and supposedly clear language structures (e.g., “three-dimensional,

solid, red, tasty fruit”). It is more by the former than the latter that we understand what we understand. Wilde writes: “Jacobi appeals from the head to the heart and asserts the legitimacy and supremacy of faith...: realities whose existence the intellect cannot prove may, and must, be acceptable upon the evidence of feeling” (Wilde 1914, 323). But the human in society seems to regularly tell himself the opposite: it is language that allows me to understand, not feeling and belief, since feeling and belief contain lies and selfishness (self-interest, bias, individualized perspectives, etc.). Typically, the human will hold this position without ever having done a thorough, honest internal study of his feelings and their correlation to the world. And typically, a human will be biased toward science, reason, and logic over feeling and faith despite the titanic linguistic and aforementioned conceptual problems that arguably plague intellectual analysis and understanding, whether in the domain of interpretation of reality via science, or in the domain, for example, of the interpretation of reality by the homeless person: e.g., what is the definition of justice, what is the definition of a nation border, what is the definition of a living fetus, etc. With linguistic understanding of concepts such as those, confusion and unknowing emerges, but with the feeling-based analytics discussed in this section, solution is not only possible, but is inborn, implanted, in the feelings of the mind by God.

We should not fully box-off the inner faculties of each of the following, belief, feeling, and thought-language—as if they are completely separate, stand-alone entities, that can be considered in isolation from the others. These inner energies and phenomenological contents would seemingly have overlap, where we would not know their precise boundaries, such as, for example, where a thought stops and a feeling starts, for lack of better wording. The operation of believing something, in the mind, will involve language—such as placing the categorizing label of language onto that which is believed in. But most of language and inner thought-talk is little more than labeling and categorizing in the mind, where not much beyond a mere labeling is known linguistically about a thing. It is feeling that steers the internal mind on *how* the items that the mind labels with language interrelate, and the understanding of how they move around and change their orientation with respect to one another. We can say that an apple is three-dimensional, solid, tasty, red fruit, but those labels do not give deep understanding, and are little more than simple labels of aspects of our inner experience of apple when we find it in our consciousness.

When one tries to go deeper than these labels to understand the apple, one immediately is venturing outside of the second-order linguistic description and residing in the first-order meta-linguistic reality of faith-feeling that Jacobi states we know reality by way of. To know what tasty or red is, we have labels of what thought-talk involve, which only reveal and work at the level of naming and labeling, but where understanding sets in with feeling and belief, which allow greater knowledge than mere naming and labeling.

3.2. The Only Way to Prove the World is Real is Because it *Feels* Real

In this subsection I will show how the aforementioned surprising evidence for feeling is the main tool of analytical analysis of reality. Consider the following:

Right now I (believe I) am awake, and I *believe* the reality I am in (which I experience as if it is outside of me) is real (mind-independent, non-imaginal). But what reason do I have to take my reality as being *real*? The answer to this question is typically given as follows: my experienced reality is, *of course*, real, since I see it (experience it), and the data of my senses therein tells me it's real: the empirical experience and data *is* the verification. That is the sort of answer I usually hear, but there is a fatal problem with that position, which can be claimed to be teased out of Descartes' *Meditations*, which is as follows: this very same experience can happen in a dream during the night, where one has what seems to be an empirical experience, in identical fashion as during waking consciousness, seeming just as real (mind-independent, non-imaginal, representational), or being believed to be just as real, as the waking consciousness. When the person awakens, they reorient to waking consciousness and deem the dream-experience to be imagination, but where within the dream experience it was taken to be as real as ordinary empirical waking consciousness is. Therefore, how can I prove that my currently waking empirical experience is the real (non-imaginal) experience and the dream is not? The answer is, of course, *that I cannot prove it*, and thus the idea that my current empirical waking state and its information is non-imaginal, and where the dream information *is* imaginal, is without any solid foundation. And the critical issue is that all one has is a *feeling* that the given reality one is in (dream or empirical, believed to be non-imaginal and mind-independent) is real, and that

leads to a *belief*, a *feeling*, that it is real. *That's it*—nothing more is used by the consciousness to determine that it's reality it (believes it) is in, at any given moment, *is real*. And for these reasons, the only reason a person *believes* their waking consciousness is real is due to *belief* that it is real, where belief is a sort of *feeling*.

The only answer a person is able to give as to how and why the world, or anything in it is real, and/or is the way it is, is because *these feel as if they are real*.

To reiterate in more expansive wording, if I were to ask you if you could prove that this physical world was a dream or instead was real, your only answer, ultimately, would be to say that it is real because your (apparent) waking-state epistemology contains a *feeling* that it is real, rather than unreal. A dream at night may feel as real as empirical waking-life when one is in the dream, but then that sentiment flips when the person wakes and orients to the empirical, wherein the dream is at that time deemed as imaginal. Automatically my waking-state has this awareness, this feeling, of being real. So, one's entire reality is known to be real based on *feeling*. If I were to ask for *an explanation* for why one reality was not real (the dream), and the other reality *is* (ordinary waking reality), asking for a logical argument for the realness of one over the other, there is no such argument available (of course this is what led to Descartes' Cogito Ergo Sum). When I am in the dream-state, I exist in the reality as if it's real, and I only believe it's real because of how it feels: my epistemology contains the feeling that the dream-state is real. But all the very same things could be said about my ordinary waking state, and the feeling of realness is identical in each, and thus there is no way claim one is more real than the other, or that one is real and the other only the screen-in-mind of imagination with no external reality it represents. If I want to claim that the dream appears less real than the ordinary reality, any such claim of that fashion will fail since when recounting the dream-state later (after one has awakened from the dream) in ordinary waking consciousness, such recounting is done via memory (thinking back on the dream that is no longer being experienced), where, arguably, memories are always less clear and vivid as ordinary and current waking consciousness (that is, what is believed to be the current empirical reality). So, the dream state could be less sharp and clear as ordinary as waking reality because it is a memory. Likewise, when one is in a dream, if in the dream one recalls the waking

consciousness from before one entered sleep, that waking consciousness may also appear more hazy since it is of the domain of memory rather than immediate experience. In these sorts of scenarios, it is not possible to specify and discover which state of consciousness is the dream, and which is the non-dream, since in each and any state of consciousness one only relies on the feeling and belief that they are experiencing what is real (external, mind-independent, non-imaginal), rather than any sort of logical formula or scientific discovery that proves external reality is real.

There is no logic, no science, no human reasoning that can prove the world exists, which is a topic little discussed in contemporary academia. Only feeling and belief offers “proof”, if one wants to call it that. And in fact, science and reason lead to widely discussed and seemingly uncomplicated apparent *disproofs* that the physical reality is real, or anything remotely like we may believe it actually is (going all the way back to Zeno 2500 years ago, all the way up to the quantum mechanical discoveries of today). This is what Jacobi was picking up on, and why he wanted to move reason from the domain of thought and language (second-order) to the domain of feeling and faith (first-order). This would mean that the domain of logic and language is incomplete in analytical treatment of reality, and the domain of feeling, is indeed more complete than logic and language at that task, which is precisely the opposite sentiment of our modern world.

3.3 Feeling and Theology No Longer Inferior to Science and Reason

The account of the previous subsection contains a (possibly strong) setback to the concepts that feeling and faith are inferior to science, logic, and reason, and to the concept that feelings in faith experience are denigrated below the level of containing technical information about the nature of reality. In simpler terms, feelings are the *primary* analytical tool for understanding reality, not science, logic, and reason. Wilde comments:

It follows, therefore, that the difference between fiction and belief lies in some sentiment or feeling, which is annexed to the latter, not to the former and which depends not on the will... Belief is nothing but a more vivid, lively, forcible, firm, steady conception of an object, than what the imagination is ever able to attain. And in philosophy we can go no farther than assert that belief is something felt by

the mind, which distinguishes the ideas of judgment from the fictions of the imagination.

If *anything* is to be presented to us as real, feeling is the only way any such thing can be known to be real: the feeling that the thing is real, and that the thing is this way or that. The red, tasty, solid, three-dimensional object can be labeled as such, but for it to be known, it is believed-in via feeling states of consciousness that are post-linguistic. Jacobi's concept of reason, or faith as reason, transcends, and thereby arguably, some could suggest, replaces the idea of reason being linguistic, logical, and scientific.

This shows his [Jacobi's]... recognition of the importance of feeling in his system. It is no longer a separate faculty of the soul, but the true reason itself—the peculiar glory of man... Instead of being undeveloped consciousness, feeling becomes the goal of all development. The whole rational organism is only for the combining of facts given in feeling. (Wilde 1894, 51-52)

According to the concepts being discussed in this paper, a Jacobian philosophy can lead to the concept that inner feeling, inner faith and intuition, somehow contains information that can be used for analytic description of reality. Indeed, it may be surmised that when one is young and one “sees” the mirage in the distance on the road during a hot sunny day, that one does not actually believe (feel) that it is truly water. I recall my first experience seeing this effect during the hot summer in Michigan in the middle 1970s when I was a child, and thinking back, while it certainly looked like water in the distance, I believe my feeling-intuition was indicating to me that I was seeing an illusion: I was seeing that which was not actually there. I do not want to suggest that there are no instances where inner faith-feeling is incorrect, but it is my opinion that if one honestly analyzes their inner feeling-intuitions, it is rather astonishing, one will discover, how accurate the feeling-mind is in its faith-intuitions, and how difficult it is to find errors in it.

As is well-known, academics typically hold the view that feelings are either not helpful in scientific and logical analysis, or are inferior, and where feelings are often even held to be contrary to logic. So to find that the verification of anything that exists, or its nature, is found in feeling is perhaps problematical for the academic, and leads to this aforementioned dilemma: does a feeling contain information? Or, putting that in different

words: Is there a truthmaker in reality leading to the information of a specific feeling having a positive truth-value, and does feeling denote some aspect of reality making our feelings true? It seems obvious that feeling contains information, and that is why feelings have different names: joy, fear, love, hope, and faith.

Feeling is typically not trusted as being a tool for accurate measurement of reality, let alone being a tool allegedly more accurate than science or reason. Feeling is typically looked at as being an internal invention, with an almost random adherence to reality. For example, person A may feel love toward X, and person B may feel hate toward X. But if X is a constant, does this mean that the feelings of A and B are mere self invention, rather than an analytical tool for discovering truth? Situations like this typically lead people to asserting that feeling is self-created and applied to reality not in a way that is measuring reality, but rather is for selfish survival behavior (to put it in evolutionary biological terms). But, A and B, being different people, will have different selves, different constitutions, in differing environments and settings, and thus A and B may have different orientations to X, wherein A and B may *rightfully* love or hate (respectively) X based on their constitutions and orientations. For example, if A is a person who loves Republicans (X), and B a person who hates Republicans, but where we find that A is a wealthy person who wants to pay less taxes, and B a non-wealthy person who wants free health care, is it not the case that the feelings of love and hate by A and B respectively are “accurate”, in so far as they involve proper information for A and B’s survivability? So, if A and B have differing feelings towards the constant X, does not automatically indicate that feeling is merely a self-invention for selfish interest, wherein A’s and B’s feelings are disqualified from being tools of discovery.

But what has been just written about A and B would indicate that it is not feeling that is a product of self-invention, but rather that feeling is often particular to each person’s setting in their world. For feeling to be some sort of God-given internal instrument of discovery about reality would mean that feelings are accurate to an astonishing degree in any given person. This is like saying, for example, that any given person’s (seemingly random, selfish, and superficial) intuitions are equally or more trustworthy than the tenets of Big Bang cosmology. Could that be the case? Determining such scientifically would be difficult, since feelings are for the most part invisible, and since people often lie about their

real feelings when asked to report them, often not even knowing what their real feelings are, or how to identify or discover them. It would seem that one would have to rely on the philosophical arguments of subsection 3.2 above to trust that feeling contains information on par with the dependability that the average person typically holds that science, logic and reason involve.

The question is, as stated above, what would be the truthmaker for *feeling*—the “thing” in the world that makes the word “feeling” do the work of denotation? I am often told by some academics that feeling is not mysterious, since it is merely a chemical activity in the brain, but when I request from them the precise chemical formula for, say, the feeling of love, *and* for verification that my feeling of love, for example, the phenomenological experience in my consciousness, *is, in fact*, that very chemical formula, I am usually not given any answer, or if I am given a generic answer, such as “dopamine”, I am not offered any empirical verification to back-up this claim. There are questions as to if neurochemistry can function as a truthmaker for feeling. And feeling, when viewed introspectively, appears incredibly different than anything else in reality, seemingly nonphysical in its appearance (when directly experienced via introspection), as if it is an element of a spirit. These points are not against, and could arguably imply, that feeling is more like God than unlike God, perhaps supporting the idea that the human internal reality is in God’s image (Gen. 1:26), where God creates the inner mind (Luke 11:40), which would provide support for Jacobi’s thesis, that faith is nothing like a random, self-invented, selfishness. Wilde writes:

What more fitting phrase can we use for our attitude toward these than to say that they are objects of belief? Indeed, are we not also justified in speaking of them as “revelations” and even as “miraculous revelations”..., since we have no proof of their reality save their actual presence to us, the possibility of which we seem in no natural manner able to explain? (Wilde 1914, 324)

4. Conclusion

If Jacobi’s findings about faith and feeling are correct, most of the people of the world have no idea that they are, and most people of the world would be looking the wrong direction (to the second-order) to learn about their reality. If something like Jacobi’s

findings are correct, a very different reality, in fact, exists. With faith-feeling (first-order), a larger picture of reality is found in consciousness than previously imagined, since we can discover that the mind, via feeling, is doing far more than previously believed. For example, the other day, in a rush, I left my house, my feelings were very unsettled, because I knew I forgot something, but I did not know what. This feeling nagged at me more and more fiercely, until finally I just stopped and traced through all my steps, wherein I realized I'd forgotten two things: to lock the door, and I'd forgotten my iPhone. I had the feeling (feeling I'd forgotten something) before I had the intellection (realizing what I'd forgotten). Virtually every person in the world knows this experience, but few realize that it could arguably verify the startling Jacobian findings in this paper.

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